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When Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bul-
ganin began their tour of India in November 1955, Pravda 
celebrated the visit with breathless references to the “flour-
ish[ing] friendship between the Indian and Soviet peoples.” 
While such rhetoric was — and would become even more — 
familiar, it marked a significant change from earlier coverage 
that castigated India as an imperialist lackey. Khrushchev, 
Bulganin, and their large retinue considered their trip to 
India (continuing on to Burma and Afghanistan) a “mission 
of friendship”; they met with scholars, cultural figures, and 
Communist leaders. They spoke at rallies with tens of thou-
sands of enthusiastic listeners, and made the obligatory visit 
to the Taj Mahal1.
Khrushchev and Bulganin’s trip became the opening 
sally in the epic battle between the Cold War superpowers. 
The era of “competitive coexistence” (the American term) 
or “the competition between two systems” (its Soviet coun-
terpart) soon encompassed much of the Third World. What 
American observers called the Soviet “economic offensive” 
led to the expansion of American aid programs in light of So-
viet efforts — and then Soviet efforts accelerated in response 
to American initiatives2.
Yet Khrushchev and Bulganin’s South Asian sojourn in 
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the grandest event in the steady turn of Soviet attentions towards what was then 
coming to be called the Third World. A few months earlier, in June 1955, Jawaharlal 
Nehru had undertaken a similarly publicized trip around the Soviet Union. And a 
few months prior to that, in February 1955, Soviet and Indian officials had signed 
an agreement for Soviet technical and economic assistance in building a massive 
metallurgical complex in the North Indian city of Bhilai.
But before any of these well-publicized visits or agreements came a set of low-
er-profile exchanges that had just as profound an effect — if not more — on Indo-So-
viet relations and perhaps on the Soviet Union itself. These visits in 1954–1956 were 
intended to shape India’s Second Five Year Plan, which stood at the intersection of 
Indian economic history and the international history of the Cold War. This article 
examines some of the early Soviet contacts with Indian planners to show the effects 
on economists and economic ideas in both countries.
One of the key figures seeking the expansion of Indo-Soviet scientific ties was 
Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis, a Bengali physicist-turned-statistician. The founding 
director of the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), Mahalanobis also held the less-than-
exalted title of Honorary Statistical Advisor to the Indian Cabinet — but more to the 
point had the ear of Jawaharlal Nehru when it came to questions of economic policy 
in the mid-1950s. Mahalanobis fashioned himself an impresario, making frequent 
trips to Moscow to promote Indo-Soviet scientific and cultural relations  — and 
not coincidentally, to promote his own role as organizer. Among the records of the 
Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union are numerous files containing upwards of 
300 pages of letters about Mahalanobis’s numerous trips and even more numerous 
proposals3. Though he made his first trip to Moscow in the dark days of late Sta-
linism, he was captivated: on his first visit to the Soviet Union in 1951, he gushed to 
a friend that his trip “was of crucial importance because I got a vivid impression of 
planning”4. Mahalanobis was hardly the only Indian intellectual enthusiastic about 
planning in the middle decades of the twentieth century; Nehru, too, was enthralled 
with the possibility of a rationally planned economy. Nehru had led the Indian Na-
tional Congress’s National Planning Committee in the 1930s, and upon Indian inde-
pendence, Nehru chaired a Planning Commission. By the time Mahalanobis was in 
Moscow, India was already well its first Five-Year Plan (1951–1956) and would soon 
begin formulating its second. It was for this purpose that Mahalanobis especially 
sought Soviet expertise5.
A delegation from the Soviet Academy of Sciences arrived in Delhi in January 
1954 to meet with senior government officials (including at least three meetings with 
Nehru) as well as Mahalanobis and other scholars. This initial delegation, sent to 
attend the Indian Science Congress, sought from the start to expand future Indo-So-
viet connections6. Within a week of their return to Moscow, Academy of Sciences 
administrators began to organize a trip of specialists to visit Delhi.
While there were many topics of interest to the Indian government, including 
natural resource exploration and expanded trade opportunities, Soviet scholars 
quickly latched onto the provision of economic expertise as a means of expanding 
Soviet ties to and influence in India. Mahalanobis told the visitors that he sought their 
assistance in promoting his vision of economic planning. There were two tendencies 
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in India during the First Five-Year Plan, he reported: the Minister of Finance and other 
economic officials sought to plan in financial terms, primarily focused upon govern-
ment resources and investments. But Mahalanobis himself had a different vision 
for planning, one he claimed to share with Nehru and his circle. They had in mind a 
plan that encompassed all aspects of the economy, not just government spending; 
it would include the bulk of the economy that was in the private sector. It would be 
more interested in how much was produced and consumed rather than how much it 
cost — “physical” as opposed to “financial” planning. This vision shared much with 
the Soviet planning system’s Balance of the National Economy (balans narodnogo 
khoziaistva), and thus Mahalanobis wanted to take advantage of the Soviet Union’s 
“vast experience with planning.” Thus, he claimed, Nehru’s circle had a great need 
for Soviet advisors in planning. As committed as he was to seeking Soviet help, 
though, Mahalanobis did not want to roil international waters. He proposed that the 
exchange avoid the appearance of an official governmental program, and instead 
be organized between scholarly institutions — his ISI working with the much larger 
Soviet Academy of Sciences. “No need,” he told his Soviet interlocutors, to “excite 
(draznit’) those unfriendly to India and the USSR” by presenting his efforts as official 
acts. Finally, he suggested that each delegation’s costs be covered by the country 
that sent it; this would reduce the appearance of dependence — and would have the 
added benefit of protecting Indian foreign exchange reserves7.
For their part, Soviet scholars were optimistic that a visiting delegation could 
serve multiple purposes. They noted that Indian scholars were well-versed in An-
glo-American scholarship, but had little exposure to Soviet work. An effective dele-
gation represented a chance to establish a Soviet beachhead in Indian intellectual 
life. If followed by an effort to translate Soviet publications into English, and with 
exchange programs bringing Indian scholars and students to the USSR, a Soviet 
delegation could be the first step in building Soviet intellectual influence in India 
more generally8.
Soviet aims went beyond general intellectual influence, though, and included 
hopes that they could shape Indian policy. Closer Indo-Soviet scholarly ties, one 
apparatchik noted, would also facilitate the “long-term strengthening the authority of 
the USSR and its science” in India. The president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 
A. N. Nesmeianov, quickly nominated a three-person delegation to travel to India 
before the end of 1954. Heading the list was M. I. Rubinshtein, a senior member of 
the Academy’s Institute of Economics9. Rubinshtein had been at the State Planning 
Committee, Gosplan, in the decade after the 1917 Revolution. After a variety of eco-
nomic posts and wartime service, he joined his colleague Jenö Varga in arguing that 
capitalism had stabilized the 1930s and 1940s. Varga and Rubinshtein argued that 
the New Deal and other efforts to fight the Depression, combined with the economic 
mobilization for World War II, meant that the final crisis of capitalism would be much 
delayed. Given the Soviet claims on the imminence of capitalist collapse and pro-
letarian revolution, this position came at a high professional cost for Varga, though 
ironically it would become standard Soviet fare by the mid-1950s10. Rubinshtein, an 
important economist of his era, lent the delegation a certain prestige. At the same 
time, his intellectual independence, visible in the Varga affair, indicated that the 
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Academy of Sciences was perhaps open to a broader rethinking of the newly inde-
pendent nations. For their part, Indian economists were especially interested in the 
experience of Gosplan in the 1920s — tellingly, before the Stalinization of the Soviet 
economy that began in the late 1920s11.
Rubinshtein’s delegation, in the end, would not have much chance to exercise 
intellectual independence: along with Nesmeianov’s nomination of the delegates to 
India were “Directive instructions” (direktivnye ukazaniia) for the delegation. Rubin-
shtein’s group should “familarize Indian scholars with the history of the creation of 
the Soviet planned economy” in order to help India build its own planning apparatus. 
It should, specifically, show how the Soviets used economic regulation of industry, 
agriculture, and trade to create the fully planned economy. In a paragraph that re-
vealed the short-lived ties between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China, 
the orders also asked the delegation to highlight the value of the Chinese planning 
experience to their Indian hosts; this was particularly true for agriculture, where the 
orders recommended the Chinese rural economy  — including peasant coopera-
tives — as a model for India. Moving beyond agriculture, Rubinshtein’s delegation 
was also ordered to promote expanded industry in the public sector12. While Soviet 
officials hoped that the delegation would deepen Soviet-Indian relations, both the 
tenor and the content of the delegation’s charge suggests that the relationship would 
not be between equals. Soviet scholars had much to teach their Indian counterparts, 
but the lessons were drafted well before departure. The lessons came from Soviet 
ideology and not from Indian circumstances or Indian scholars.
Mahalanobis used his next trip to Moscow in July 1954 to work out the details 
for the Soviet delegation trip to come that autumn, and to press the case for ex-
panded Soviet ties13. Both sides came away from the conversations with heightened 
enthusiasm for the possibility of using Soviet experience and expertise to shape 
Indian planning. The Soviet Minister of Culture G. F. Aleksandrov covered a wide 
range of topics in his conversation with Mahalanobis, all of which would expand So-
viet-Indian relations through the exchange of artistic delegations, films, music, and 
publications14. While Soviet officials were eager to build intellectual bridges to India, 
they hesitated to get directly involved in economic advising. As one memorandum 
regarding that 1954 delegation put it with scare quotes to demonstrate uncertainly 
about whether India was in fact engaged in planning in the Soviet sense:
The task of our Soviet economists should be limited to consultations, communicating our 
experience. We should not take responsibility for the formulation of a perspective “plan” or 
become official advisors and experts working out this “plan”15.
Mahalanobis apparently ignored such reticence. He envisioned flows of eco-
nomic expertise in the context of a larger effort to “strengthen the bonds of friend-
ship” between the two nations16. Not coincidentally, these connections would expand 
Mahalanobis’s own role as culture broker. The relatively warm welcome Mahalanobis 
received from Soviet officials may well have been related to their confusion about 
his status; they treated him as a government official — which Mahalanobis encour-
aged  — and referred to his organization, erroneously, as the Central Statistical 
Institute17.
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Cultural relations aside, Mahalanobis remained especially interested in eco-
nomic planning, and his summer 1954  trip to Moscow left him excited about the 
future. He saw the budding connection with Soviet scholars and officials as providing 
the chance to advance his own agenda and his own career in India. He told his friend 
and colleague Pitamber Pant that Soviet advice and aid would be instrumental to 
building a planned economy. He queried Rubinshtein and others about general 
approaches as well as specific policies. He was reassured by their insistence that 
Chinese-style agricultural cooperatives could be organized without compulsion18. He 
responded with similar enthusiasm (and credulity) to Soviet talk of physical planning, 
which he saw as “the heart of planning”19. He told Soviet economists that planning 
was one route to undertake nationalization of industry, which he strongly supported20. 
Mahalanobis also sought Soviet assistance in bringing electronic computers to his 
ISI. In a breathless letter to Pant, Mahalanobis said he sought not aid but technology 
and technique: “it is not money, not money, NOT MONEY I am worrying about,” but 
“technical knowledge.” Mahalanobis was, in his own words, “greatly stimulated and 
excited by the possibilities of planning on the lines indicated by Soviet experts”21.
The Soviet delegation ultimately included nine scholars, a secretary, and three 
translators. Rubinshtein and fellow economists D. D. Degtiar’ and L. Iu. Pisarev were 
based at Mahalanobis’s ISI in Calcutta, where they interacted with scholars from 
all over the world — including planners like the French Marxist Charles Bettelheim 
and the Polish economist/planner Oskar Lange as well as the American Marxist 
Richard Goodwin (then teaching at the University of Cambridge). The Soviets de-
voted themselves to explicating the experience of the Soviet planned economy to 
fellow scholars at ISI as well as to other leading Indian officials. They contributed to 
debates over the fundamentals of the Second Five-Year Plan, including the emphasis 
on heavy industry, the use of physical (and not financial) planning, the best means to 
increase employment, and the size of the public sector. By their own reports, Soviet 
scholars were very much in line with Mahalanobis’s own views22.
But members of the Soviet delegation hardly limited their interactions to 
scholars in Calcutta; they also operated in the corridors of official power. They met 
with Minister of Finance C. D. Deshmukh, Planning Commission Secretary Tarlok 
Singh, and Nehru himself, who visited ISI on Christmas Day 1954. Nehru’s holiday 
talk included a strong plug for physical planning, also endorsed by the Soviet del-
egation — and which soon came in for sharp criticism in the Indian press. A seem-
ingly technical matter of units of accounting of the plan, then, became an important 
marker of aspirations and inspirations for the Second FYP23. Soviet visitors also met 
frequently with the Planning Commission in February 1955, a crucial period in for-
mulating the Second FYP. Degtiar’ cited the Soviet experience in his discussion, and 
also was among those advisors promoting physical planning as a means of insuring 
a bold plan: India “should not allow financial resources to impede economic devel-
opment”24.
Indeed, India’s Second Five-Year Plan, debated between 1954 and 1956 and 
covering the period 1956–1961, expressed Indian officials’ ambitions without refer-
ence to India’s economic constraints. Nehru, working with his de facto planner-in-
chief, Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis, offered a plan that differed dramatically from 
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the somewhat scattershot and unambitious first plan; Mahalanobis called the first 
plan an “anthology,” but wanted the second plan to be a “drama”25. The Second Plan 
aimed to increase national income dramatically — by 5 % per year. It also called for 
unemployment to be “liquidated” — common Soviet terminology — within a decade. 
The key to this growth would be heavy industry, which would be “expanded with all 
possible speed”  — and in the public sector. Thus the Plan called for tripling steel 
production in only five years. This new industrial capacity would free India of the 
need to import steel while at the same time providing the spur for a more general 
economic expansion. To promote this sector, public expenditures on heavy industry 
almost tripled from the first plan, to the detriment of project spending on social 
services and agriculture26. The elaborate Indian planning process, which built on a 
widespread (if not universal) consensus about India’s industrial future, hardly de-
terred policy-makers in the Cold War camps from trying to sway it.
American officials, too, tried to shape the plan. The Republican administra-
tion of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, for instance, dispatched economist Milton 
Friedman to Delhi in autumn 1955, hoping to spread the gospel of markets, free 
trade, and foreign investment. Friedman went to India wanting to change economic 
policy there — even though he had a realistic (and, ultimately, accurate) assessment 
of the low chance he would have an impact. In his memoirs, Friedman recalled that 
the Eisenhower administration sent him to India to “counter the influence of the left-
wing advice” that Mahalanobis was receiving from others27. In fact, Friedman’s trip 
came about after the head of America’s aid agency agreed with the sympathetic 
Indian Finance Minister about the need to bring a distinguished economist to India 
“to consult on planning”28.
Like the Soviet delegation had, Friedman wrote his economic prescriptions be-
fore diagnosing Indian symptoms. Visiting Washington in August 1955 for predepar-
ture briefings, Friedman left State Department officials with the impression that he 
“believed that a country must follow either an entirely free enterprise course or one 
mostly if not entirely regimented.” He asked others at State about some of India’s 
leading economic policy-makers, doubting that they really believed in the private 
sector since they endorsed public investment; promoting one public sector industry, 
Friedman insisted, was tantamount to rejecting private enterprise tout court. Con-
versations in India did little to convince him of any merits of a mixed economy; he 
wrote to his official sponsors after the trip that he was “struck” by “the disparity… 
between what [the Indian] government thinks it is doing and the facts of economic 
life”29. In a conversation with Tarlok Singh, Friedman realized the futility of his effort 
to effect changes to the Second Plan; “Apparently,” he recorded in his notes, “major 
policy issues have been decided”30. Friedman’s observation was astute. By the time 
Friedman arrived in late 1955, the broad parameters of the Second Plan were already 
well established; ISI economists were working out the details of the Plan, not the 
ultimate structure.
That structure, furthermore, bore some resemblance to the Soviet vision. 
Hence it is little surprise that Soviet observers, from Khrushchev and Bulganin 
through scholars at the Academy of Sciences, praised India’s Second Five-Year 
Plan. As the doyen of Soviet Indologists, R. A. Ul’ianovskii, put it, “the fact that India 
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is borrowing from the planning experience of the socialist countries in its effort to 
escape from backwardness and to suppress its economic dependence on foreign 
capital by the country’s industrialization is fact of enormous progressive signifi-
cance”31. Soviet observers by and large concurred with Mahalanobis’s logic that 
rapid industrialization could serve as a protection against the depredations of global 
monopoly capitalism32.
Yet all of this cheerleading — Soviet observers rooting for public sector industry 
and planning, American experts for agriculture, private sector and markets  — ul-
timately had little effect. While the economic advice was widely solicited, at great 
expense and effort for many individuals and institutions, the net effect of the whole 
foreign advising enterprise was very close to zero. This meager result was in large 
part by design; the purpose of the whole advising enterprise was not to emulate 
other models but to learn specific techniques, from Western economists and East-
Bloc planners alike. As Mahalanobis put it, “I am completely convinced that, if we are 
serious, we shall be able to get the fullest technical information and help in planning 
from the USSR. ” And his travels convinced him, he told one friend and colleague, 
that “there is nothing ready-made in the West which we can acquire or transfer… 
[but] I also know that we can use some of the Western economists to our great 
advantage”33. Reaching across the Cold War divide, then, Mahalanobis sought the 
technical expertise necessary to formulate the full Second Plan.
Yet the foreign experts and Mahalanobis’s own overseas travels served another 
purpose as well. They provided external validation for the efforts of the Planning 
Commission, validation that Mahalanobis could (and did) cite in seeking domestic 
political support for his aims. The steady stream of visiting experts gave him the 
standing to defend policies that he had sought in the first place. As he was the 
first to acknowledge, foreigners’ expert advice on economic planning helped win 
domestic political battles over the size and shape of the Second Five-Year Plan. He 
compared the role of foreign experts to “airforce cover for the army”: their advice 
did not necessarily change the direction of attack, but provided helpful firepower 
supporting what was already under way34. Elsewhere Mahalanobis noted that the 
“greatest benefit” of the visitors was that they reinforced his ideas: “through contacts 
with such eminent experts from many different countries we gained confidence in 
our way of thinking”35. For all the rhetoric — from Americans and Soviets — about 
guiding the “young Republic of India” by proffering economic advice, then, Indian 
leaders pursued their own economic vision unaffected by all of the economic advice 
they worked so hard to obtain.
Yet the interactions of Soviet and Indian economists affected scholars from 
both countries. The introduction of a core concept of the Soviet economics in the 
1950s and 1960s owed much to the Soviet encounter with India, and indeed had 
radical implications about the nature of socialism around the world. That concept — 
the “non-capitalist path” was (like most innovations in Soviet thought) attributed 
to Lenin. It would be mistaken, the Bolshevik leader told a Comintern gathering in 
1920, to assume that “the backward nations must go through the capitalist path of 
development”36. Khrushchev opened the door for a revival of this concept in one of 
his less-famous (and shorter) speeches at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 
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1956: “The forms of the transition to socialism,” he told Party leaders, will become 
all the more variable” and may not “always be connected with Civil War”37. Just as 
Khrushchev’s widely publicized “Secret Speech” at the Twentieth Party Congress 
marked a turning point in Soviet history, so too did Khrushchev’s remarks on the 
non-capitalist path consolidate a new approach to the Third World. As Politburo 
member Anastas Mikoian told Nehru shortly after the end of the Twentieth Party 
Congress, Khrushchev “did not formulate a new foreign policy; what [he] did was 
to give a more precise character to the policy which had been developed” over the 
previous year38.
A few months later M. I. Rubinshtein bolstered Khrushchev’s claim from the 
Twentieth Party Congress when he published a two-part article in the high-profile 
English journal New Times. He argued that the path to socialism need not — as or-
thodox Marxists had long argued — run through capitalism en route to Communism. 
India’s experience, Rubinshtein indicated, suggested an alternative path, one that 
might not even entail violent revolution. He rehearsed the recent talk of socialism 
in India, including the recent Congress Party declaration that its ultimate aim was 
to create a “socialistic pattern of society.” Yet he drew a distinction between this 
“socialistic pattern” and socialism full stop. The rapidly expanding public sector 
was not, as American officials feared, tantamount to the arrival of socialism; it was 
instead what Rubinshtein called (again quoting Lenin) “state capitalism.” State 
capitalism was progressive, in the Soviet framework, because it contributed to 
industrialization (and therefore the rise of an industrial proletariat) and because it 
was a blow to global capitalism. While Rubinshtein based his argument on evidence 
from India, he saw the “non-capitalist path” as relevant to much of the Third World. 
Chastising “dogmatists” who were determined to “squeeze realities into their own 
artificial schemes,” Rubinshtein celebrated the concept of the non-capitalist path 
as proof of the “multiplicity of forms of socialist development”39. These claims of 
multiple forms of development marked a dramatic departure from Stalinist ortho-
doxy, and they carried with it significant implications not just for the emergence of 
socialism in the Third World, but also the possibility of different forms of actually 
existing socialism in Eastern Europe.
While Rubinshtein’s explication of the “non-capitalist path” may seem like a 
response to Khrushchev’s speech a few months earlier, Rubinshtein’s earlier writ-
ings point to an alternative genealogy of the concept. Between his return from Delhi 
in 1955  and before Khrushchev’s speech at the 20th Party Congress, Rubinshtein 
published a handful of primarily factual reports on Indian planning — in which he sug-
gested alternative trajectories for Indian economics and politics. First came an over-
view of economic development in India, in which he enumerated the key goals of the 
second Indian Plan while also drawing distinctions between the Indians’ “socialistic 
pattern of society” and true socialism. In his closing paragraphs, he celebrated the 
chance to study the Indian present for what it revealed about the past and the future:
As a geologist at a huge section (razrez) sees strata of different geological eras, so too the 
economist can see firsthand in modern India the elements and the remnants of various socio-
economic systems. The remnants of the distant past, the complex and often contradictory present, 
and the first germs of the future are interwoven in a bizarre combination. Sometimes these germs 
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[of the future] are still weak. They often try to drown the weeds of the old and obsolete world. But 
these germs will win because you can not slow the wheel of history (koleso istorii)40.
Contemporary India, in other words, contained a mixture of different historical 
stages along the inevitable path towards socialism. It was not, therefore, easily cat-
egorized in the familiar terms of Soviet Marxism, but was a “bizarre combination” all 
its own. Yet he was not yet ready to name that historical stage. Rubinshtein’s next 
reflection on India was similarly guarded, but at the same time suggested a new 
conception of Indian development. As most Soviet observers did, he celebrated 
the emphasis on heavy industry, but praised it in unusual terms. Heavy industry 
was important, Rubinshtein insisted, because it provided a mechanism for estab-
lishing economic independence and also for improving the living conditions of the 
“popular masses.” The notion that capitalist industrialization could improve living 
conditions was unusual, given that Rubinshtein elsewhere dismissed Indian claims 
that they were building socialism41. By the time Rubinshtein published a pamphlet 
on India in 1956, he emphasized the significant differences between Soviet and 
Indian approaches to economic issues, and noted that it was not the task of the 
Soviet Union (or, for that matter, of the Communist Party of India) to remake India 
in its own image42. And shortly thereafter came the New Times articles, which used 
India as a jumping-off point to articulate fully the theory of a non-capitalist path to 
development. Rubinshtein’s travel to and studies of India, then, accelerated the 
broader Soviet reconsideration of the non-capitalist path, and with it a core element 
of Soviet eschatology. There was still one ultimate destination for history  — Com-
munism — but there was, theoretically at least, more than one way to get there. The 
Soviet encounter with India, its first close-up encounter with colonies and former 
colonies of Europe after the Stalinist deep-freeze, contributed to a major revision of 
Soviet ideology.
Ironically, then, the early missions from Moscow to Delhi had, perhaps, a 
stronger effect on the sending country than the recipients. Mahalanobis’s enthu-
siasm for importing planning helped him build a technical edifice for his vision of 
Indian economic policy — and to build domestic support for it. But he did not seek 
to build an Indian version of Gosplan. For the Soviets, meanwhile, the encounter 
with India contributed to a reimaging of the developing world. The teachers, in other 
words, had learned from their students.
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